(The Varieties of) Love in Contemporary Anglophone Philosophy by Bagley, Benjamin
 1 
(The varieties of) love in contemporary Anglophone philosophy 
Benjamin Bagley 
ABSTRACT: This chapter assesses theories of the nature of personal love in 
Anglophone philosophy from the last two decades, sketching a case for 
pluralism. After rejecting arationalist views as failing to accommodate 
cases in which love is irrational, and contemporary quality views as giving 
love the wrong kind of reason, it argues that other theories only account 
for different subsets of what a complete theory of love should explain. It 
therefore concludes that while love always consists in valuing someone as a 
particular individual, there are multiple ways of doing this, corresponding 
to multiple kinds of love. (6,954 words.) 
The example of love most discussed in contemporary Anglophone philosophy, originally 
introduced by Bernard Williams, is a man who saves his drowning wife over a stranger. 
Though clearly morally permissible under the circumstances, Williams argued that as far 
as the husband is concerned this should be beside the point. The alternative, he claimed, 
“provides the agent with one thought too many” (Williams 1981: 18). If the man were 
willing to save his wife only on that condition, his concern would lack something vital. 
Williams meant this case to illustrate a general point, about the unconditional 
nature of the commitments—often but not always aptly described as matters of love—we 
necessarily have to whatever makes our lives worth living. (See e.g. Wolf 2015.) But it’s 
also been read more narrowly, as concerned with the justification of partiality in 
interpersonal relationships, and still more narrowly as concerned with the nature of love 
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for individuals. “It’s odd,” Derek Parfit once remarked, “that Williams gives, as the 
thought that the person’s wife might hope he was having, that he is saving her because 
she is his wife. She might have hoped that he saved her because she was Mary, or Jane, or 
whatever” (Murphy 2000: 140n36). In other words, she might have hoped that he saved 
her out of love for her in particular, and not just because he saw her as a generic locus of 
moral obligation or spousal concern. But what could it be to love someone in this way? 
This chapter aims to assess representative recent answers to this question and 
tentatively defend a pluralist one. To love someone is to value them as an individual, but 
there are multiple ways to do this. Each is responsive to a different kind of value, and 
involves its own forms of response. This is important for two reasons. First, theories of 
love that might seem like competitors are often better understood as complements, such 
that each aims to describe different modes of love. Second, while prototypical cases of 
love often involve multiple modes at once, conflating these can lead to serious confusions. 
1 Love as a topic in normative theory 
Philosophers normally use “love” exclusively to refer to love for individuals as such. It’s 
worth asking what justifies this. Perhaps love is essentially for individuals as such—so 
anything less isn’t really love—but I don’t find this obvious. Maybe romantic love is 
socially constructed, as Carrie Jenkins (2017) claims, so that whether something can truly 
be called romantic love is a function of how well it plays the roles associated with the 
concept in the speaker’s society. Given what these roles seem to be in Jenkins’s and my 
society, it wouldn’t surprise me if seeing someone as a generic object of certain 
instrumental desires—say, as at once sexually desirable and someone it would suit one’s 
preferred self-image to be with—would qualify. 
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Nevertheless, there would still be good reason to single out love for the individual 
as an object of special interest. It involves a fundamentally different mode of concern for 
its object than that for generic objects of instrumental desire, and this is what makes love 
important to basic normative theory. Partly, this is because love’s focus on the individual 
gives it distinctive normative significance, which we need to understand to assess its 
relationship to other normative domains. If the man in Williams’s example saved his wife 
because he saw her as at once sexually desirable and someone it suited his preferred self-
image to be with, the explanation of his act wouldn’t “silence comment” (Williams 1981: 
18) in anything like the way it should if he saved her out of love for her. Furthermore, it’s 
famously puzzling how loving someone as an individual is compatible with loving them 
for reasons. Responses to this puzzle highlight basic issues about the nature and scope of 
rationality, which will be much of my concern below. 
1.1 Irreplaceability, constancy, and reasons for love 
“For someone who is eager to help the sick or the poor,” Harry Frankfurt writes, “any 
sick or poor person will do. With regard to what we love, on the other hand, that sort of 
indifference to the identity of the object of concern is out of the question. Substituting 
some other object for the beloved is not an acceptable and perhaps not even an 
intelligible option. The significance to the lover of what he loves is not that of an 
exemplar; its importance to him is not generic, but ineluctably particular” (Frankfurt 
1999: 166). Frankfurt thinks this element of irreplaceability means that love neither admits 
of nor requires reason. For reasons necessarily consist in “general and hence repeatable” 
(169) properties, Frankfurt argues, and any repeatable properties that could give him 
reason to love his children could give him reason equivalently to love someone else. 
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One response to this concern is to argue it’s overblown. Perhaps the properties for 
which we love people are rare enough to make them irreplaceable in practice, and that’s 
all that matters. It’s not easy to find someone who is passionate about board games, has 
the brand of wit you most enjoy in people, and looks kind of like your celebrity crush; the 
possibility of finding another might seem moot. Among other problems, this reply 
conflicts with love’s constancy. Love should persist through an indefinite range of changes 
in the beloved’s personality, appearance, and other properties. But if reasons for love are 
general enough to imply this, how can they be specific enough to single an individual out? 
Frankfurt’s arationalism avoids this problem, but has consequences many readers 
find incredible. Perhaps the clearest counterexample comes from Troy Jollimore, who 
imagines a man who feels Frankfurtian love—an involuntary, non-instrumental, self-
affirming concern—for a “1959 Oklahoma Today Mickey Mantle baseball card” (Jollimore 
2011: 22). Realistically, the man fetishizes the card: he loves because of a value he 
erroneously attributes to it. Perhaps he’s obsessed with it because it’s so rare; perhaps he 
worships Mantle, and the card is the centerpiece of his shrine. Or perhaps he doesn’t love 
it at all. If he really sees nothing about the card as giving him reason to care about it, his 
attitude seems less like love than a bizarrely internalized compulsive tic, akin to Warren 
Quinn’s (1993) case of a man with a primitive urge to turn on every radio he sees. 
This suggests that pace Frankfurt, love admits of and requires reason. Furthermore, 
it suggests that love is broadly speaking a mode of valuing: it consists in experiencing 
certain properties as giving you reason to respond to the beloved in certain ways.1 Thus 
                                                
1. Or, equivalently, Or, equivalently, to experience the properties as making such responses fitting. (It 
shouldn’t be assumed that valuing in this broad sense is especially cognitive or self-conscious. See n. 3.  
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the lesson of the baseball-card-compulsive is that attitudes that don’t involve valuing 
aren’t intelligible as love, and the lesson of the baseball-card-fetishist is that if the 
properties you treat as giving you reason to respond lovingly actually don’t—that is, they 
aren’t actually lovable to you in that way—then you love irrationally. 
1.2 Quality views and wrong kinds of reasons 
Obviously, this leaves us with the problems of irreplaceability and constancy. It also 
leaves us with another problem, which is less discussed but which I suspect more 
fundamental: generically admirable, attractive, or desirable qualities don’t seem to 
constitute the right kinds of reasons for love. 
Thomas Hurka puts the problem nicely. “It’s actually puzzling,” he writes, “why 
admirable qualities should be thought a reason for all the elements in love. That someone 
is virtuous or intelligent is certainly a reason to admire her, but why is it a non-
instrumental reason to want her company or to want her to be happy?” (Hurka 2017: 
170) That is, Hurka accepts a quality view, on which lovable properties include personal 
qualities that distinguish the beloved from others. For Hurka, these can be anything that 
makes someone admirable, attractive, or desirable. “Kindness, honesty, or, more 
generally, virtue,” (165) “intelligence, wit, or aesthetic sensitivity,” (165) or “the color of 
your beloved’s hair or her particular scent” (166) are all possibilities. Hurka recognizes, 
however, that love isn’t admiration or attraction, and that reasons of love aren’t 
instrumental. You can have instrumental reason to want an intelligent person’s company, 
or want a virtuous person to be happy because you think they deserve it. But the ways we 
normally have reason to value both properties seem unrelated to the ways we have reason 
to value beloveds. 
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Many quality theorists offer sophisticated accounts of irreplaceability and 
constancy, but equally puzzling lists of lovable qualities. Thus, Jollimore claims the 
lovable properties largely consist in “attractive qualities such as charm, intelligence, 
humor, physical beauty, moral virtue, and so on—the sort of universalizable qualities in 
terms of which a person’s attractiveness or desirability is typically assessed” (Jollimore 
2011: 25-26). Sara Protasi (2014: 22) offers a similar list, albeit with the proviso that the 
properties are only lovable in the specific forms in which they’re experienced in a 
particular relationship or from a particular perspective. Simon Keller’s main examples 
are “graceful dancing, sensible conversation, and strength of will,” along with “being a 
good listener, being sensitive, being generous,” and “[knowing] exactly how to treat 
[one’s lover] when he is in a bad mood” (Keller 2000, 165-166). All these qualities can be 
admirable, attractive, or instrumentally desirable, but it’s obscure what—above and 
beyond this—makes them lovable. (Knowing exactly how to treat you when you’re in a 
bad mood is indeed valuable in a beloved, but it is likewise valuable in a valet.) 
The problem is particularly acute with respect to other elements of love, like the 
special interest we take in a beloved’s evaluative perspective. Thus, Dean Cocking and 
Jeanette Kennett argue that a “process of mutual drawing is partly constitutive of 
[companion] friendships” (Cocking and Kennett 1998: 506)—wherein friends 
characteristically shape each other’s evaluative perspectives in light of their mutual 
interest and receptivity—and Jollimore proposes that love aims at “identification with the 
beloved,” as an “attempt to make contact with the beloved’s inner life, to unite her 
perspective on the world with one’s own” (Jollimore 2011: 26). But a beloved’s good looks 
don’t in themselves seem to give me any reason to “get infected by [their] enthusiasm for 
ballet” (Cocking and Kennett 1998: 504). Their aesthetic sensitivity might, but it’s 
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obscure how it can give me the right kind of reason—if I love the person, their 
enthusiasm is infectious because it’s theirs, not just because it’s objectively well founded. 
Similarly, why should someone’s intelligence be a reason to unite their perspective on the 
world with one’s own, other than in the sense of pooling information? 
Hurka admits he lacks a solution to the problem, but seems to be optimistic that 
there is one. I’m not—at least not for the generically admirable, attractive, or desirable 
qualities he thinks are lovable. This is because treating these qualities as lovable in 
themselves strikes me as not only mysterious but objectionable. There’s something 
fetishistic about noninstrumentally wanting someone to be happy just because they’re 
charming or intelligent, as though that somehow made them matter more; treating 
someone’s good looks as reason to get infected by their enthusiasm for ballet bespeaks a 
lack of integrity, since it would mean allowing one’s interests to shift in response to 
transparently irrelevant factors. In themselves, then, generically admirable, attractive, or 
desirable qualities are just that. They give the wrong kind of reason for love. Some might 
warrant love indirectly or under special circumstances, but before considering this 
possibility, let’s consider views that look elsewhere. 
2 Agapic love 
J. David Velleman (1999, 2008) and Kieran Setiya (2014) defend broadly agapic views of 
love, on which people are lovable in virtue of their humanity.2 For Velleman, this means 
humanity in the Kantian sense: rational nature or moral personhood. For Setiya, it means 
                                                
2. Yao MS develops a more nuanced agapic view appealing to a secularized form of grace, on which 
the beloved’s humanity is importantly linked to their imperfections.  
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literally being human. For both, humanity constitutes noninsistent reason for love: it makes 
it rationally permissible, but not required, to love anyone. 
This may seem radically to reject irreplaceability, but Velleman’s analysis is 
trenchant. Irreplaceability consists in how beloveds are valued, he proposes, not how they 
are selected. To value you as replaceable is to value you relative to my prior ends, for 
which your contingent properties make you suitable; to value you as irreplaceable is to 
value you as an end in yourself. Kant’s theory of rational nature lets us understand this 
distinction. Since rational nature is the source of value in general, heightened emotional 
receptivity to it in someone entails heightened emotional receptivity to whatever is 
independently normatively significant about them. This general suspension of emotional 
defenses, Velleman argues, is what love consists in. 
On Velleman’s view, then, beloveds are valued as special in the sense people are 
told they’re special in preschool. It is a profound truth that everyone is special in this 
sense, but notoriously cold comfort to anyone worried about being special to certain 
people. One might therefore wonder whether the selective love we worry about in these 
cases is the same as that Velleman describes. 
It certainly wouldn’t be if humanity were insistent reason for love, since then 
loving selectively would be irrational. The problem, as Niko Kolodny argues, is that some 
reasons for love are insistent. Kolodny imagines what it would be like to stop loving your 
child or closest friend, in the absence of any relevant changes in either of you: nobody has 
done anything bad, undergone a shift in character, or forgotten the relationship. “You 
just wake up one day,” he writes, “to find that [the person] means nothing to you” 
(Kolodny 2003: 168). Presumably, this would be irrational: “an inappropriate emotional 
response, analogous to the failure to fear what is patently fearsome. If this happened to 
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you, you would find it alarming, to say the least. Even from the inside, it would seem that 
something had gone wrong, that your emotional reactions were seriously dysfunctional” 
(168). 
3 Loving attachment 
Conceding the point, Setiya admits the agapic view may need to countenance 
relationships as additional reasons for love. This is Kolodny’s view. Love, Kolodny 
argues, consists in treating your relationship with someone as a source of reasons for 
partiality and emotional vulnerability to both them and the relationship, in ways 
appropriate to relationships of that type.3 This elegantly answers Frankfurt: the general 
and hence repeatable property that gives Frankfurt reason uniquely to love his children is 
just the relational property of being one’s child. 
In my view, the relationship theory is a convincing account of what might be 
called loving attachment. This is not strictly speaking a species of personal love, since 
relationships to animals, activities, and things can ground partiality and emotional 
vulnerability in the same way. The only difference is that interpersonal relationships can 
introduce special considerations that justify correspondingly special concern. (See e.g. 
                                                
3. This compressed formulation (from Kolodny 2003: 150-151) leaves out Kolodny’s claim that love 
“partly consists in the belief that some relationship renders it appropriate, and the emotions and motivations 
of love are causally sustained by this belief” (Kolodny 2003: 146), which leads some (e.g. Hurka 2017) to reject 
Kolodny’s view as overintellectual. However, this criticism is unfair. It does not target Kolodny’s core 
claim—that love consists in treating relationships as reasons—but rather his further claim that treating 
relationships as reasons involves robust regulation by one’s normative beliefs about them. I agree the latter 
is implausible, but the former doesn’t entail it.  
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Kolodny 2010.) This generality is a strength of Kolodny’s view, but it’s also symptomatic 
of its main weakness. Surely our really personal relationships are fundamentally about what 
the people we have them with are like—rather than our histories with them—as our 
relationships with cars aren’t, and our familial relationships aren’t always. Here the 
relationship theory gets things backwards: it “inverts the order of justification between 
love and loving relationships” (Protasi 2014: 215).4 
There are two ways to articulate this concern. One is to object (with Stump 2006, 
Protasi 2014, and Setiya 2014) that the relationship theory makes paradigm cases of 
unrequited love irrational. Unsurprisingly, Kolodny anticipates this objection. He claims 
it conflates love and attraction. Love differs from attraction in essentially involving 
“noninstrumental concern” (Kolodny 2003: 171), and noninstrumental concern is indeed 
irrational in the absence of a relationship. I find the second claim plausible, but not the 
first. As Protasi argues, unrequired love is valuable because “it expresses the capacity of 
attributing a special role to a person in one’s emotional life without demanding that the 
other person do the same” (Protasi 2014: 218). Presumably, this can be more than just 
attraction, but needn’t involve unwonted concern. 
This leads to the second, deeper problem. For Protasi, the special emotional role 
attributed to the beloved is grounded in the value of their qualities. The relationship 
theory denies this. It allows that love can—indeed, often should—involve specially 
valuing a beloved’s qualities, but only because they happen to be qualities of someone 
you’re in a relationship with. In some cases, this is the right result. Parents at school 
recitals are not connoisseurs. But in others, the value of the qualities comes first. Precisely 
                                                
4. For similar complaints, see Abramson and Leite 2011, Zangwill 2013, and Bagley 2015.  
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in virtue of qualifying the beloved for their special emotional role, the beloved’s qualities 
define the value a relationship with them would have. 
Perhaps the best example is the most famous case of unrequited love in 
philosophy: 
I don’t know if any of you have seen him when he’s really serious. But I 
once caught him when he was open like Silenus’s statues, and I had a 
glimpse of the figures he keeps hidden within: they were so godlike, so 
bright and beautiful, so utterly amazing—that I no longer had a choice—I 
just had to do whatever he told me (Symposium 216-217). 
Alcibiades loves Socrates for the singular beauty he sees in him. His attitude transcends 
mere attraction, because of the particularity of its focus—Alcibiades loves Socrates in his 
ineffable uniqueness—and the depth and generality of the significance it attributes to its 
object, manifested inter alia in Alcibiades’s intense desire to know and be known by 
Socrates, and in his “naked vulnerability to criticism” (Nussbaum 1986: 189)—Socrates is 
the only person who can make him feel shame. Alcibiades certainly wants a relationship 
with Socrates, but only as a relationship with Socrates, individuated in terms of the qualities 
that define him. These are what set the conditions under which the relationship 
Alcibiades wants would persist as valuable, and explain how Alcibiades would have 
reason to respond to Socrates in its context. 
Our really personal relationships are rarely as purely or intensely aspirational as 
Alcibiades’s, but share its order of justification. Were our friends or lovers to respond to 
our qualities like parents at school recitals, we would feel patronized. We want them to 
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value their relationships with us specifically in virtue of qualities they find compelling, and 
would still find compelling without the relationship in place.5 
4 Reactive love 
This brings us back to the quality view. Recent quality theorists often aim to 
accommodate love’s irreplaceability the same way Kolodny does, by arguing that you 
only have reason to love people with whom you stand in certain historical relations. The 
difference is that for them, the historical relations (which may or may not be relationships 
in Kolodny’s sense) aren’t sources of reason but enablers—a consideration that doesn’t 
normatively ground a response directly, but enables other considerations to. So reasons 
for love consist in qualities that lots of people might have, but are only lovable in certain 
relational contexts. (See Jollimore 2011, Keller 2013, Protasi 2014, and Naar 2017.) This 
doesn’t itself account for constancy, but since the qualities can be very general, defenders 
of this proposal often argue it wouldn’t be rational to continue loving someone who lost 
them.6 
However, this doesn’t address the other problem from §1. Even if generically 
admirable, attractive, or desirable properties could somehow acquire special significance 
in the right relational contexts, this wouldn’t necessarily turn them into the right kinds of 
reasons for love. It’s here that Kate Abramson and Adam Leite’s proposal stands out. 
Love, they argue, is among what P. F. Strawson (1974) famously called the 
“reactive attitudes”—broadly emotional responses to properties of an agent’s will that are 
                                                
5. I give a somewhat more involved argument for this in Bagley 2015: 487–489.  
6. Jollimore 2011 and Protasi 2014 explore other ways to accommodate constancy, along with 
unrequited love.  
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relevantly expressed in conduct. The “conduct” part is key: resentment is a response to 
malice or culpable indifference, and gratitude to goodwill, but only when their possessor 
has actually expressed them in mistreating or helping you. Similarly, Abramson and Leite 
propose that “reactive love” (Abramson and Leite 2011: 677) is appropriate in response to 
certain morally “laudable traits that are especially salient in the context of fairly intimate 
relationships” (679) that have been “expressed in a way directed towards the lover in an 
appropriate relational context” (696). 
I think this is correct up to a point. Certain laudable traits can indeed warrant 
special attachment when appropriately expressed in relatively intimate contexts, but this 
is because they really warrant other reactive attitudes—namely, gratitude, trust, and 
admiration—rather than love per se. This isn’t entirely a bad thing: Abramson and Leite’s 
view highlights how these other attitudes can change what it’s like to relate to a person in 
a way that explains many of the reasons we prototypically have toward beloveds. There 
are, however, crucial reasons of love that transcend these. 
One of Abramson and Leite’s main examples—from Sense and Sensibility—
illustrates this. For them, the solicitude Colonel Brandon shows the Dashwoods during 
Marianne’s illness is paradigmatically lovable: it’s “precisely the sort of character trait that 
would be relevant to anyone in an intimate (familial, friendly, marital) relationship with 
the Colonel” (Abramson and Leite 2011: 679), and its expression “towards Marianne and 
those she loves is key to making sense of her growing love for him” (681). The problem is 
that there’s no textual evidence Marianne actually does feel growing love for Colonel 
Brandon at this point in the novel, or at any point before the epilogue. None of her 
remaining dialogue is addressed to him, and in fact she only mentions him in it once, as 
someone to borrow books from during her anticipated life of seclusion. When she marries 
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him, it is with “intimate [knowledge] of his goodness,” but “no sentiment superior to 
strong esteem and lively friendship” (Austen 1933: 378). Only “in time” does Marianne’s 
“whole heart” become “as much devoted to her husband, as it had once been to 
Willoughby” (379). 
“Strong esteem and lively friendship” is an excellent description of the attachment 
that gratitude, trust, and admiration enable when jointly occasioned in intimate contexts. 
To see how, begin with gratitude. While we are typically grateful to strangers for discrete 
benefits we don’t expect to be repeated, our gratitude to closer acquaintances is 
paradigmatically for informal expressions of goodwill that blend together and shape our 
relationships over time. If our gratitude for these benefits was like gratitude to strangers—
which involves something akin to the desire to settle a debt—we would be rejecting the 
friendly spirit in which they were meant. Instead, we feel friendly in turn: we are broadly 
sympathetic, warm-wishing, and willing to help. As these feelings are mutually 
reciprocated over time, they become responses to a shared history of beneficence, and 
settle into generalized concern for the other’s welfare. 
This strikes me as the basis of a promising explanation of reasons for partiality in 
friendship. (Compare Kolodny 2010.) Other apparent reasons of love seem likewise 
explicable in terms of other reactive attitudes, in conjunction with our reasons for caring 
about intimate relationships. In intimate contexts, reasons for trust become reasons for 
the self-disclosure many writers have upheld as characteristic of friendship. (See e.g. 
Thomas 1987; for a defense of trust as a reactive attitude, see e.g. Holton 1994.) We want 
to share private and potentially embarrassing experiences and opinions, and be 
spontaneous with others without worrying about our conduct being held against us. This 
is particularly important with people we admire. Most of us have a basic desire for the 
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people we admire to think well of us, which gives us special reasons for self-disclosure and 
sensitivity to the other’s judgments. (Recall Alcibiades’s vulnerability to Socrates’s 
criticism, or—since we’re now in Austen territory—Emma Woodhouse’s vulnerability to 
Knightley’s.) Importantly, all these responses inform, enhance, and sustain each other. 
People who trust each intimately are normally positioned to care for and admire each 
other in ways others don’t have access to. This in turn tends to engender deeper and 
more specific forms of intimacy, thereby constituting a unified form of attachment that 
deserves to be called love. 
Partly, Austen would agree: goodness intimately known warrants strong esteem 
and lively friendship. Austen’s implication that this isn’t love is obviously tongue in cheek, 
a playful jibe at Marianne’s immature romanticism. But in her subsequent description of 
Willoughby, she identifies precisely what it lacks. “In spite of his incivility in surviving her 
loss,” she writes, Willoughby “always retained [for Marianne] that decided regard which 
interested him in everything that befell her, and made her his secret standard of 
perfection in women;—and many a rising beauty would be slighted by him in after-days 
as bearing no comparison to Mrs. Brandon” (Austen 1933: 379-380). In addition to 
making Willoughby an archetypical unrequited lover, this element of interested attention 
gives the best loving relationships—like Marianne’s relationship with her older sister—
their depth and vitality. Marianne may feel it for her husband eventually, but when she 
does it will be for reasons left to the reader’s imagination. 
5 Aesthetic love 
That Willoughby loves Marianne is evinced in how she determines his standards rather 
than merely meets them. Alexander Nehamas (2007) offers a rich account of this 
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phenomenon as a response to beauty. While such accounts are hardly new, they’re often 
taken—as in Gregory Vlastos’s (1973) critique of Plato—to make beloveds essentially 
replaceable: loving someone for their beauty is loving beauty in them, which when done 
properly should shift one’s love to beauty in general. For Nehamas, however, the truth is 
the opposite: beauty essentially demands loving attention to the individuality of its object. 
To find something beautiful, Nehamas argues, is to experience it as calling for 
ongoing, open-ended, and emotionally receptive attention to as yet unnoticed or 
underappreciated properties of it, for reasons that necessarily outrun one’s present 
conception of its value. As a consequence of this attention, one’s conception of a beautiful 
object’s value becomes increasingly deep, complex, and specific to that thing—while 
never becoming fully determinate—in ways one necessarily can’t anticipate. Since this 
makes it is impossible fully to specify any criteria by which anything distinguishable from 
the object would be equivalently valuable, beautiful objects are valued as irreplaceable. 
Nehamas’s view similarly captures how reasons for attraction and emotional 
vulnerability to beloveds can be appropriately particular to them. Earlier, we saw that 
aesthetic sensitivity wasn’t in itself the right kind of reason to get infected by a beloved’s 
enthusiasm for ballet because it should be their enthusiasm that matters, not the fact that it 
was well-founded. On Nehamas’s view, claims like these “signify that [the property] 
functions aesthetically here: it is a factor that draws me to you and contributes to my 
finding you beautiful” (Nehamas 2007: 100). In these cases, my reasons for responding 
lovingly to you reflect a value I see in you that might depend on any number of your 
properties, but which I’ll never be able fully to specify as long as I’m still responsive to it. 
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Saying a beloved’s enthusiasm is infectious because it’s theirs can thus be the best 
explanation available.7 
That said, the example is in one respect infelicitous. It’s possible to find someone’s 
enthusiasm beautiful without finding it infectious—without experiencing it as something to 
be shared. But this is what distinguishes love that values persons as persons from love that 
values them as things. (Compare Frye 1983 and Langton 1997.) Socrates’s beauty makes 
him lovable to Alcibiades in the first sense, but not all beauty is like this. A canonical 
example, which Nehamas discusses in depth, is Death in Venice. Aschenbach is an aging 
writer and Tadzio a teenage boy, whose beauty provokes in Aschenbach a desire so 
consuming as to lead him to abandon his dignity and, eventually, expose himself to the 
epidemic from which he dies. “Aschenbach’s passion is fueled by a particular 
interpretation of Tadzio’s beauty,” Nehamas (2007: 104) writes, which is putting it mildly. 
It is a paradigm case of projection, transparently grounded in desires and associations for 
which Tadzio is a catalyst and screen. It regards Tadzio as an aesthetic object, and is 
basically insensitive to his interests. At one point, it occurs to Aschenbach that he ought to 
warn Tadzio’s family about the cholera sweeping the city, but he finds himself almost 
totally unmotivated to: this would deprive him of his irreplaceable object of desire. 
While it would be artificially moralistic to deny that Aschenbach loves Tadzio, his 
love is obviously imperfect, even as a mode of broadly aesthetic engagement. In my view, 
this is because it fails to engage specifically with the beloved’s agency. 
                                                
7. Nehamas 2016 attributes Montaigne’s famous epigram—“if you press me to tell you why I loved 
him, I feel that this cannot be expressed except by answering: because it was he, because it was I”—to this 
indeterminacy. 
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6 Aspirational love 
It’s often argued that the values to which we are fundamentally committed—our deepest 
principles, ideals, and aspirations—constitute our identities as agents. This would make 
someone for the values with which they identify a way of loving them for who they are in 
themselves—for their essence, rather than their accidents. Thus, numerous 
philosophers—often inspired by Aristotle’s (1999) view of virtue friendship—argue that 
people are lovable in virtue of identifying with the same values as oneself. (See e.g. 
Nussbaum 1990, Whiting 1991, Westlund 2008, and Brewer 2009.) 
Though consonant with the evident importance of shared values to loving 
relationships, this generates a special problem akin to that of constancy. Beloveds whose 
evaluations perfectly mirror yours are boring, and lovers who expect your evaluations to 
perfectly mirror theirs are suffocating. Both things seem essentially inimical to love. 
Unanticipated divergences from your own evaluations should seem interesting, exciting, 
to be welcomed. But how, then, would the other’s values be lovable for being like yours? 
What I will call aspirational views of love aim to resolve this problem by arguing 
that a beloved’s values are lovable as dynamic, rather than static: not as what they now 
determinately are, but as what they are in the process of becoming.8 On the aspirational 
view I defend, this is because the contents of our values can be fixed by the particular 
responses we take to be expressive of them over time—on condition that they remain 
jointly intelligible as conforming to a unified norm (Bagley 2015: 491-496). I liken this 
process to musical improvisation, so that the experience of a particular way of playing as 
                                                
8. For other accounts of reasons of love as dynamic, see Rorty 1986, Brewer 2009, Helm 2010, and 
Nehamas 2016.  
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inchoately expressive reflects the as-yet-indeterminate character of the musical ideas or 
themes in the process of being expressed. Love, then, is like improvising with a partner. It 
consists in valuing the beloved as improvisationally pursuing the same values as oneself, 
and therefore in attributing the same significance to the beloved’s responses in 
determining one’s values one attributes to one’s own. In practice, this would make a 
beloved’s enthusiasm for ballet infectious because you experience it emotionally as partly 
defining the values you’re inchoately pursuing yourself. In this, aspirational and aesthetic 
love resemble each other: both involve experiencing the beloved as demanding essentially 
individualized attention and emotional engagement, for reasons that are never fully 
determinate but become increasingly sophisticated and specific over time. The difference 
is that the aspirational lover’s attention is focused on the expression of an evaluative 
perspective loved as autonomous, independent, and equally authoritative. 
Like its counterparts, however, there are essential features of love I doubt the 
aspirational view accounts for. First, though I argue aspirational love necessarily involves 
concern for the beloved’s autonomous flourishing (Bagley 2015: 504), this concern is 
instrumental. My concern for my friends isn’t, entirely: it’s largely that of reactive love. 
Second, the aspirational view doesn’t capture the diversity of the qualities for which we 
love. All kinds of qualities—including ones whose appeal is exquisitely perverse—can 
draw you to someone in their particularity and give them a grip on your attention and 
desire. Even when these include someone’s values, the love they prompt may be aesthetic. 
I love my parents substantially for the values I see embodied in their lives, but I’m not 
sure I love them aspirationally: that would conflict with the distance that, like many 
grown children, I want to maintain between their perspectives and mine. My attitude is 
more like that toward characters in whose narratives one has become deeply invested. 
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7 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I’ve sketched what I think are five plausible sources of reason for love, 
each represented in the current literature: 
(i) humanity, for agapic love, 
(ii) valuable historical relationships, for loving attachment, 
(iii) reasons for intimate gratitude, admiration, and trust, for reactive love, 
(iv) beauty, for aesthetic love, and 
(v) dynamically shared values, for aspirational love. 
All constitute reason to value someone as irreplaceable—whether this consists in valuing 
them in their individuality (agapic and aesthetic love), in the context of a concrete 
historical relation (loving attachment and reactive love), or both (aspirational love)—and 
to respond to them in recognizably loving ways. As such, all constitute reason for love. 
However, none is redundant. Each, I’ve argued, only accounts for different 
subsets of what a complete theory of love should explain. If this is right, theories that 
appeal to different of these reasons aren’t really competitors. Rather, they describe 
different, mutually irreducible kinds of love. Any complete theory of love will have to be 
pluralistic, and include them all. 
This is important, because conflating them yields confusion. For example, Kieran 
Setiya’s (2014) affirmation of agapic love leads him to reject both any quality view and 
(more startlingly) the moral requirement to save the greater number. First, Setiya finds it 
“profoundly troubling” (Setiya 2014: 257) that it should ever be irrational to love 
someone. Because this requires that there be sufficient reason to love anyone, Setiya 
concludes that reasons grounded in qualities are “redundant” (258). I agree that this 
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situation would be troubling, but I would find it even more troubling if I had sufficient 
reason to love just anyone aesthetically or aspirationally, or if just anyone had sufficient 
reason to love me in those ways. Because these consist in different responses than agapic 
love, reasons for the latter don’t—again—make reasons for the former redundant. 
Setiya’s argument against saving the greater number—which returns us to 
Williams’s original case—rests on a similar but subtler mistake. Setiya insists that it is 
rational “to act for the sake of someone you love, moved by a concern for her that is not 
contingent on how she relates to you. This is how I would want my wife to act if she were 
in your place: to save me not because I am her husband or because we have the 
relationship that we do, but spontaneously, just because it was me” (Setiya 2014: 266). 
Largely, I agree. But one thing we’ve seen in this chapter is how thoughts of the form 
“because it was her” can stand in for complex individualized considerations grounded in 
multiple forms of love. Here, it stands in for the complex, individualized respects in which 
a partner’s drowning can be unthinkable—respects that would give her screams a singular 
intensity, her struggles a singular wrenchingness, her loss a singular horror. In this 
situation, I imagine I would be moved by considerations like these. The facts constituting 
my reasons for love would not figure into my practical reasoning as premises, but 
“motivation [by belief in them] need not be self-conscious” (Setiya 2014: 267)—it can 
function as a background belief that makes intelligible the motivations from which one 
acts directly. We can see this applies here by comparison to adjacent, deficient cases. If 
the belief turned out to be false—if I saved the woman because she looked like my wife 
from a distance—I would retrospectively regard my singular concern as an emotional 
misperception corresponding to the visual one. And if I felt this concern for someone 
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absent any beliefs about who they were to me, I would regard it as a fit of insanity. (If 
someone felt that way about me, I would find it incredibly creepy.) 
*     *     * 
I suspect Setiya would recognize that his argument can be resisted in this way. His aim is 
less to “compel assent” (Setiya 2014: 276) than to formulate an ethics of agape in terms 
that capture its appeal. As such, his argument significantly adds to our understanding of 
how love can be a source of philosophical challenge and possibility, and is in that respect 
consonant with my main aim in this chapter. The case I’ve sketched for pluralism 
cautions against forcing a richly heterogeneous phenomenon into an artificially narrow 
mold. This would necessarily deny part of what makes love by turns grounding, uplifting, 
exhilarating, sublime, maddening, and dangerous. 
 23 
References 
Abramson, K. and Leite, A. (2011.) “Love as a Reactive Emotion,” Philosophical Quarterly 
61: 673–699. 
Aristotle (1999) Nicomachean Ethics, trans. T Irwin, Indiana: Hackett. 
Austen, J. (1933) Sense and Sensibility, ed. R. W. Chapman, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Bagley, B. (2015), “Loving Someone in Particular,” Ethics 125: 477–507. 
Brewer, T. (2009) The Retrieval of Ethics, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Cocking, D., and Kennett, J. (1998) “Friendship and the Self,” Ethics 108: 502–527. 
Frankfurt, H. (1999) “On Caring,” in Necessity, Volition, and Love, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Frye, M. (1983) “In and Out of Harm’s Way: Arrogance and Love,” in The Politics of 
Reality, Berkeley: Crossing Press. 
Helm, B. (2010) Love, Friendship, and the Self: Intimacy, Identification, and the Nature of Persons, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Holton, R. (1994) “Deciding to Trust, Coming to Believe,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 
72: 63–76. 
Hurka, T. (2017) “Love and Reasons: The Many Relationships,” in E. Engels Kroeker 
and K. Schaubroek (eds.) Love, Reason, and Morality, London: Routledge. 
Jenkins, C. (2017) What Love Is And What It Could Be, New York: Basic Books. 
Jollimore, T. (2011) Love’s Vision, Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Keller, S. (2000) “How Do I Love Thee? Let Me Count the Properties,” American 
Philosophical Quarterly 37: 163–173. 
 24 
—— (2013) Partiality, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Kolodny, N. (2003) “Love as Valuing a Relationship,” Philosophical Review 112: 135–189. 
—— (2010) “Which Relationships Justify Partiality? The Case of Parents and Children,” 
Philosophy and Public Affairs 38: 37–75. 
Langton, R. (1997) “Love and Solipsism,” in R. E. Lamb (ed.) Love Analyzed, Boulder, 
CO: Westview. 
Murphy, L. (2000) Moral Demands in Nonideal Theory, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Naar, H. (2017) “Subject-Relative Reasons for Love,” Ratio 30: 197–214. 
Nehamas, A. (2007) Only a Promise of Happiness: The Place of Beauty in a World of Art, 
Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
—— (2016) On Friendship, New York: Basic Books. 
Nussbaum, M. (1986) “The Speech of Alcibiades: A Reading of the Symposium,” in The 
Fragility of Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and Philosophy, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
—— (1990) “Love and the Individual: Romantic Rightness and Platonic Aspiration,” in 
Love’s Knowledge: Essays on Philosophy and Literature, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Plato (1997) Symposium, trans. A. Nehamas and P. Woodruff, in J. Cooper (ed.) Plato: 
Complete Works, Indianapolis: Hackett. 
Protasi, S. (2014) “Loving People for Who They Are (Even When They Don’t Love You 
Back),” European Journal of Philosophy 24: 214–234. 
Quinn, W. (1993) “Putting Rationality in Its Place,” in Morality and Action, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Rorty, A. O. (1986) “The Historicity of Psychological Attitudes: Love Is Not Love Which 
Alters Not When It Alteration Finds,” Midwest Studies in Philosophy 10: 399–412. 
 25 
Setiya, K. (2014) “Love and the Value of a Life,” Philosophical Review 123: 251–280. 
Stump, E. (2006) “Love, by All Accounts,” Proceedings and Addresses of the American 
Philosophical Association 80: 25–43. 
Strawson, P. F. (1974) “Freedom and Resentment,” in Freedom and Resentment and Other 
Essays, London: Methuen. 
Thomas, L. (1987) “Friendship,” Synthese 72: 217-236. 
Velleman, J. D. (1999) “Love as a Moral Emotion,” Ethics 109: 338–374. 
—— (2008) “Beyond Price,” Ethics 118: 191–212. 
Vlastos, G. (1973) “The Individual as Object of Love in Plato,” in Platonic Studies, 
Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Westlund, A. (2008) “The Reunion of Marriage,” Monist 91: 558-577. 
Whiting, J. (1991) “Impersonal Friends,” Monist 74: 3–29. 
Williams, B. (1981) “Persons, Character, and Morality,” in Moral Luck, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Wolf, S. (2015) “‘One Thought Too Many’: Love, Morality, and the Ordering of 
Commitment,” in The Variety of Values: Essays on Meaning, Morality, and Love, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
Yao, V. (MS) “Grace and Alienation.” 
Zangwill, N. (2013) “Love: Gloriously Amoral and Arational,” Philosophical Explorations 16: 
298-314. 
